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NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
CONSENSUAL APPLICATION OF BLACK
BOX ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OF
BENEFITS CLAIMS
FRANK PASQUALE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Recent calls for administrative austerity have included demands that agencies
do more with less as they make decisions about benefit eligibility.1 This economic
logic dovetails with a business case for automating consideration of disputes. The
field of computational legal studies suggests ways of deploying natural language
processing to triage case filings, or otherwise to find patterns in past adjudications
in order to inform (or even complete) the resolution of disputes.2 For example, a
certain combination of medical records may have always led to an award of
disability benefits in the past. Administrators may decide to fast track such claims
or may even decide to award benefits on the basis of those medical records.
Conversely, claims that look too unlike past, successful claims, may be rejected
at the outset, ideally with some instructions as to how they may be improved.
In the longer term, more ambitious surveillance programs may feed into
administrative adjudications. For example, there are calls in the United States to
review the eligibility of benefits recipients via evidence that could include
surveillance of their social media feeds.3 However, using black box AI to deny
Copyright © 2021 by Frank Pasquale.
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project;
formerly Piper & Marbury Professor of Law, University of Maryland, and Schering-Plough Professor in
Health Care Regulation and Enforcement, Seton Hall University. I wish to thank the Brooklyn Law
School Dean’s Summer Research Fund for supporting this research. I wish to thank organizers,
participants, and commenters in the Law and Contemporary Problems symposium on black box AI and
the rule of law for the opportunity to present these ideas in an intellectually rigorous setting.
1. JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 145, 170 (2019) (discussing neoliberal
managerialism in the judiciary and administrative state).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE AND DANIEL N. ROCKMORE, EDS., LAW AS DATA:
COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (2019); RYAN WHALEN, ED.,
COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN RESEARCH
(2020).
3. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET OVERVIEW 17–18 (2018),
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY19Files/2019BO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CJH-NZPQ] (“We will study and
design successful strategies of our private sector counterparts to determine if a disability adjudicator
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benefits is an untested and dangerous proposal. Even when algorithms are
transparent, problems arise. For example, Australia’s CentreLink agency used
defective algorithms and data to mail thousands of letters to claimants
demanding return of alleged overpayments. Many were inaccurate, causing a
great deal of distress among those who received the demand letters.4
Nevertheless, there are promising avenues for automation of law. Tax
scholars have argued that as many as 100 million filed tax returns in the United
States each year may be unnecessary, wasting millions of hours of tedious formfilling and record-keeping. Instead, the government could simply automatically
decide the tax liability of persons who take the standard deduction.5 With more
advanced data, and tax laws written to be machine-readable, even complex
returns may be automated.6 Thus, automated administration offers both
promising possibilities and clear warning signs with respect to potential negative
consequences.7
Black box AI may eventually play an important role in several of the use cases
mentioned so far. For purposes of this Article, “black box AI” refers to any
natural language processing, machine learning, textual analysis, or similar
software which uses data not accessible to the data subject, and/or which deploys
algorithms which are either similarly inaccessible, or so complex that they cannot
be reduced to a series of rules and rule applications comprehensible to the data
subject.8
There are many ways in which governments may deploy black box AI in
administrative adjudications. For example, they may apply it to all claimants, or
only those who consent to its use. Further, they may apply its algorithms only to
materials submitted by claimants, or they may sweep a wider set of data into the
should access and use social media networks to evaluate disability allegations. Currently, agency
adjudicators may use social media information to evaluate a beneficiary’s symptoms only when there is
an OIG CDI unit’s Report of Investigation that contains social media data corroborating the investigative
findings. Our study will determine whether the further expansion of social media networks in disability
determinations will increase program integrity and expedite the identification of fraud.”).
4. See Terry Carney, The New Digital Future for Welfare: Debts Without Legal Proofs or Moral
Authority?, U. NEW S. WALES L.J. F., Mar. 2018, at 1–2. Carney has observed more recently that while
automated implementation of welfare schemes may contribute to unfairness, deeper problems in the
Australian welfare system may be the root cause of recent scandals. See Terry Carney, Artificial
Intelligence in Welfare: Striking the Vulnerability Balance? 46 MONASH U. L. REV., no. 2, 2020, at 3.
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS 103–07 (2008) (arguing
for the elimination of most deductions and credits in order to simplify tax liability). Automation is already
in widespread use at the IRS. Danielle K. Citron & Ryan Calo, The Automated Administrative State: A
Crisis of Legitimacy, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11) (on file with author) (describing
how the IRS already is using algorithmic processes to decide whom to audit).
6. See Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60, 78 (2017) (arguing for default
logic based statutes because “[a]rtificial intelligence based on default logic can more easily encode
statutes and extract information from statutes than artificial intelligence based on standard logic.”).
7. See Citron & Calo, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that erroneous rules led to automated systems
violating the due process guarantees of beneficiaries in the public benefits arena).
8. This definition is developed in Chapter 1 of FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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black box AI’s purview. This Article will typologize key normative concerns
raised even in scenarios where black box AI is consented to by the claimant.9 Part
II examines the normative desirability of consent-based black box AI use cases
involving materials submitted by the claimant. Part III analyzes use cases
involving a wider universe of materials not submitted by the claimant. I conclude
with reflections on the important function of reasoned explanation in even mass
justice systems.
II
NORMATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING BLACK BOX AI USED TO PROCESS
SUBMITTED MATERIALS
A deal between the litigant and the state to permit the state or its
instrumentalities to use black box AI to analyze submitted materials will likely
have more procedural legitimacy than a deal permitting the use of a wider
universe of data. Litigants can control what they submit, taking on responsibility
for “quality control” and accuracy. Nevertheless, there are important, often
unexpected side effects of such agreements which need further illumination,
mitigation, or elimination before they are embraced.
Simply treating a certain class of persons better than others on the basis of
black box AI highlights a deep tension between utilitarian ethics and the rule of
law. Despite the compelling utilitarian rationale for such automated adjudication
of benefits, it is difficult to fit the “determination” at issue into classic
administrative law categories of rule or order, fact or law. Is the hypothetical
matching based on similarities between past and current applications a legal or
factual determination? Perhaps the two can be split apart so that the relevant
NLP is limited to only reviewing the facts section of the claimant’s submission, or
only the law section. Yet this possibility would undermine the legitimacy of the
NLP, since there should be some connection between the facts and the law in
even the most summary determination.
Further problems arise when considering the significance and purpose behind
distinctions made by black box AI. Assume, for example, that the entire
submission is reviewed via a comparison with similar, past submissions. The key
question then becomes, what is the nature of the similarity discovered?10 If the
similarity is only based on something superficial (say, the number of periods and
9. I save for future work an assessment of the imposition of black box AI without consent, or the
use of black box AI to preemptively award benefits before a case is actually adjudicated. For a typology
of the general types of issues raised by the opacity of data and its processing, and the revisability of
judgments, in adjudications, see Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While
Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2014).
10. Perhaps there is no similarity analogous to the types of reasoning done by extant forms of legal
analysis. The NLP may be doing something sui generis, as Judge Geneviève Vanderstichele has suggested
in her illuminating work. See Geneviève Vanderstichele, The Normative Value of Legal Analytics. Is
There a Case for Statistical Precedent? (Aug. 30, 2020) (MPhil thesis, University of Oxford),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474878 [https://perma.cc/FRY2-2K2W].
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punctuation marks in the document, or the presence of certain words with ample
synonyms used in other, unsuccessful submissions, ceteris paribus), the problem
of arbitrariness rears its ugly head.11 While arbitrary “givings” may not be nearly
as problematic as arbitrary takings, they nevertheless raise serious questions
about the specifically legal nature of the AI in question.12
Given these concerns about black box AI relying on arbitrary distinctions,
why not simply use NLP to identify the neediest cases based on some algorithm
of merit or urgency? This seems like a more plausible goal for NLP than the more
complex question of applying law to facts (ramified, as it necessarily is, by
theories of interpretation, precedent, and internal guidance on limits to the
number of claims that can be granted).13 An algorithm of neediness may assist as
pure description (albeit value-laden) of some dimension of the claimant’s case.
However, those crafting such algorithms must be very attentive to the advice of
members of the relevant communities (here, of poor and disabled persons), lest
the system be biased.14 Moreover, a “neediest case” black box AI developer
should be attentive to long-standing debates over just principles of allocation of
resources.15
11. Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism,
68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63, 75 (2018) (“[T]he entire ‘predictive’ project . . . may be riddled with spurious
correlations. As any student of statistics knows, if one tests enough data sets against one another, spurious
correlations will emerge.”).
12. I use the category “givings” as defined in Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111
YALE L.J. 547, 549 n.2 (2001).
13. As Yoshua Bengio explains: “[a]nother big challenge is natural language understanding . . . [is]
still not at the level where we would say the machine understands. That would be when we could read a
paragraph and then ask any question about it, and the machine would basically answer in a reasonable
way, as a human would. We are still far from that.” Will Knight, Will Machines Eliminate Us?, MIT TECH.
REV., Jan. 29, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/01/29/162084/will-machines-eliminate-us/
[https://perma.cc/5W4R-8A5P].
14. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY (1st ed. 2018); Seeta Pe a Gangadharan,
Digital Inclusion and Data Profiling, 17 FIRST MONDAY (2012), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v17i5.3821
[https://perma.cc/Z23L-8UXS]; Michele E. Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 25
(2008); Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, & Vincent M. Southerland, Litigating Algorithms 2019
US Report: New Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, A.I. NOW INST. (2019),
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/E778-JA5M]; Litigating
Algorithms: Challenging Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, A.I. NOW INST. (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SKQ-BW9X]; Dillon Reisman,
Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford, & Meredith Whittaker, Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical
Framework for Public Agency Accountability, A.I. NOW INST. (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2CQ-FMF9]. For an example of the perils
apparent here, see K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703 (D. Idaho 2016) (a case hinging on application
of a widely criticized algorithm to benefits determinations).
15. The diversity of theories of distributive justice, and differences between them, matter, too. For
instance, “Amartya Sen illustrates these differences with a story about three children and a flute. One
child justifies her claim to the flute because she is the only one of the three who can play and would
therefore receive the most pleasure from owning the flute. Another child claims the flute on the ground
that he is impoverished and has no toys of his own; the flute would therefore increase his happiness and
his share of economic goods. The third child demands the flute because she actually made the flute; she
therefore has a right to the flute because it is the product of her own labor. How we resolve the question
of which child receives the flute will likely depend on whether we favor utilitarian, economic egalitarian,

03_PASQUALE (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2021]

9/15/2021 3:35 PM

NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF CONSENSUAL APPLICATION

39

Including more “humans in the loop” of decisionmaking may also ameliorate
the alienating effects of black box AI. The legal scholar Guido Noto La Diega
has categorized several rationales for avoiding the dehumanization of decisionmaking in law generally, many of which apply here.16 He gives “good reasons not
to trust” algorithms, even when they meet some standard of accuracy with respect
to a given dataset:
First, design choices make the decisionmaking process or the factors it considers too
opaque; these choices may also limit the control of the designer. Second, the output of
the system may be affected by the biases in data collection. Third, unlike human beings,
algorithms cannot balance biases in interpretation of data by a conscious attention to
the redress of the bias. Fourth, there are biases in the ways that learning algorithms are
tuned based on the testing users’ behavior. Fifth, algorithms may be designed for a
purpose, but then inserted into systems designed for other purposes. Lastly . . . another
factor is the biases in the data used to train the decision-making systems.17

To be sure, there are many dedicated attorneys, computer scientists,
philosophers, and social scientists now working to address concerns like these.18
Indeed, the fields of AI ethics and algorithmic accountability will have much to
contribute to law in coming decades. However, even if researchers and
policymakers manage to address all the concerns mentioned by La Diega, there
is still the “role reversibility” problem raised by Stephen Henderson and Kiel
Brennan-Marquez.19 Their argument is that “in a liberal democracy, there must
be an aspect of ‘role-reversibility’ to judgment. Those who exercise judgment
should be vulnerable, reciprocally, to its processes and effects.”20 The problem
with AI case determination, or even some super-sophisticated robot judge, is that
is cannot experience punishment the way that a human being would. Rolereversibility is necessary for “decision-makers to take the process seriously,
respecting the gravity of decision-making from the perspective of affected
parties.” Brennan-Marquez & Henderson derive this ideal from basic principles
of self-governance:
In a democracy, citizens do not stand outside the process of judgment, as if responding,
in awe or trepidation, to the proclamations of an oracle. Rather, we are collectively
responsible for judgment. Thus, the party charged with exercising judgment—who
could, after all, have been any of us—ought to be able to say: This decision reflects

or libertarian conceptions of justice.” Shannon M. Roesler, Addressing Environmental Injustices: A
Capability Approach to Rulemaking, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 49, 60 (2011) (citing AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA
OF JUSTICE 12–14 (2009)). Even within egalitarian conceptions of merit, which would include a “neediest
cases” algorithm, the concept of need may be defined differently by different groups.
16. Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making –– Algorithmic
Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, J.
INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COM. L., no. 9, 2018, https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-9-1-2018/4677
[https://perma.cc/C6ST-PRJ7].
17. Id. at 8–9.
18. ACM CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY (Jan. 14, 2021)
https://facctconference.org/ [https://perma.cc/S9CV-4ECK].
19. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and RoleReversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2019).
20. Id. at 140.
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constraints that we have decided to impose on ourselves, and in this case, it just so happens
that another person, rather than I, must answer to them. And the judged party—who
could likewise have been any of us—ought to be able to say: This decision-making
process is one that we exercise ourselves, and in this case, it just so happens that another
person, rather than I, is executing it.21

Thus, for Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, “even assuming role-reversibility
will not improve the accuracy of decision-making, it still has intrinsic value.”22
There are of course some challenges to this position from devotees of robot
“personhood.” They may claim that a robot programmed to be terrified of being
confined or turned off or denied electric power, for example, would be able to
“empathize” before it imposed imprisonment, the death penalty, or a benefits
denial, on a person. But a silicon-based machine (that is replicable and
replaceable) could offer only a simulation of terror (and, a fortiori, empathy) that
carbon-based, irreplaceable, dependent, rational animals like ourselves actually
feel at the prospect of serious disadvantage.23 Brennan-Marquez and
Henderson’s recognition of this ontological divide should be foundational for
future work on AI and law, as it underscores an ineliminable advantage of human
over machine judgment.
Another line of critique would emphasize the distance of many jurists from
the experience of the persons’ they are passing judgment on. Judges and other
legal decisionmakers often lead lives far removed from those subject to their
decisions, and this problem is particularly acute in benefits cases, where the
decisionmaker usually enjoys a secure, middle class job, and the claimant is
financially insecure. Nevertheless, there is still some basic grounding of common
experience of such judges and persons judged, which can never be attained by
entities that do not share a common biological substrate, which underwrites the
experiences of mortality and natality that Hannah Arendt described so well as
foundational to the human condition.24
Brennan-Marquez & Henderson build on a long tradition of scholarship
which focuses on the intrinsic value of legal and deliberative processes, rather
than their instrumental value. Their focus runs against the grain of a utilitarian
American legal tradition that, while immensely influential for decades, does not
exhaust our ethical commitments—and often manages to entirely misconceive
them. For example, applications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous Mathews v.
Eldridge calculus have frequently failed to take into account the effects of
abbreviated procedures on claimants’ dignity—what George Kateb describes as
a foundational commitment to respect.25
21. Id.
22. Id. at 142.
23. FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE
OF AI (2020), chapter 8; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999).
24. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
25. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976)
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As Brennan-Marquez and Henderson show, bureaucracies, including the
judiciary, have enormous power. They owe litigants a chance to plead their case
to someone who can understand and experience, on a visceral level, the boredom
and violence portended by a prison stay, the brutal need resulting from the loss
of benefits, the sense of shame that liability for drunk driving or pollution can
give rise to. And as the classic administrative law case Morgan v. U.S. held, even
in complex administrative processes, the one who hears must be the one who
decides.26 Brennan-Marquez and Henderson teach that it is not adequate for
persons to play mere functionary roles, gathering data for more authoritative
machines. Rather, persons must take responsibility for the transparency and
explainability of adjudication. To forsake this is to compromise the dignity of
claimants.
III
NORMATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING BLACK BOX AI USED TO PROCESS A
WIDER UNIVERSE OF MATERIALS NOT SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT
The concerns discussed in Part II apply to the use of black box AI in
administrative adjudications of benefits when they are based on materials
submitted by claimants. Black box AI that utilizes a wider universe of materials
beyond those submitted by claimants poses additional and distinct normative
considerations. Nevertheless, at some point in the future, this technology may
become a feature of our legal system.
Consider a kind of automated benefit determination where a kiosk may take
a claimant’s picture and then use facial recognition technology to connect the
claimant to all manner of databases of spreadsheet entries about, surveillance
camera footage of, and audiorecordings of the claimant.27 A voice like that of
Google Assistant, Siri, or Alexa may state to the claimant that the case will be
based not only on written submissions, but also on surveillance of what the
claimant has been doing in public and on social media for the past several months.
Given the intense scrutiny of factual matters that are part of the standard for
claiming disability, a wide variety of data may be canvassed by such AI. It may
assess whether the claimant been seen exercising vigorously, or standing and
walking for more than four hours in a row. Does the claimant’s phone
(“Decisions with substantial ‘moral worth’ connotations are generally expected to be highly
individualized and attentive to subjective evidence. The adjudication of such issues on the basis of
documents submitted largely by third parties and by adjudicators who have never confronted the
claimant seems inappropriate. Instead, a court approaching an analysis of the disability claims process
from the dignitary perspective might emphasize those aspects of disability decisions that focus on a
particular claimant’s vocational characteristics, his unique response to his medical condition, and the
ultimate predictive judgment of whether the claimant should be able to work.”); GEORGE KATEB,
HUMAN DIGNITY 1 (2011).
26. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
27. I offer this hypothetical in the spirit of a Dennett-ian “intuition pump.” DANIEL C. DENNETT,
INTUITION PUMPS AND OTHER TOOLS FOR THINKING 5–7 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1st ed. 2013).
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accelerometer and related tracking technology disclose a gait that correlates with
the gait of those previously found disabled? How many applications for jobs has
the claimant submitted? All these factors may be commensurated and
compressed down to a single score to assess likelihood of disability. Should such
assessments play a role in administrative adjudications? This hypothetical system,
involving black box AI that uses a wide universe of data concerning many aspects
of the claimant’s life, raises considerations distinct from those raised by black box
AI analysis of the claimant’s own submissions alone.
The surveillance such a system entails is deeply alienating in two important
senses of the term. First, there is a sense of powerlessness, in that this automation
furthers “the alienation of man from man, and the degradation of men into
commodities.”28 Persons are simply processed, like any other commodity, with
observable behavior displacing experience and explanation. In other words,
direct person-to-person communication and interpretation are displaced by
behaviorist computation.29 The black box AI may have been programmed by
persons, but there is little to no chance of their interaction with the claimant—or
the claimant being able to influence the selection and processing of the pivotal
information.
The second sense of alienation here is that black box AI can create
meaninglessness regarding choices and rules. As sociologist Melvin Seeman
explains: “We may speak of high alienation, in the meaninglessness usage, when
the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe—when the individual’s
minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met.”30 Black box AI
can create this condition, leaving the objects of its surveillance uncertain,
menaced, and second-guessing themselves. “Am I walking too fast,” one might
ask, “demonstrating that I really am fit for work?” Or “is this website visit too
long, some evidence of distraction from jobseeking?”31 Policymakers should not
encourage the development of such all-encompassing self-suspicion.32
Ethical problems proliferate as we consider the potential scope of
surveillance. First, there is the normalization of data–gathering in spaces that

28. Melvin Seeman, On the Meaning of Alienation, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 783–84 (1959).
29. On the deep connections between AI and behaviorism, see ERIK J. LARSON, THE MYTH OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2021).
30. Id. at 786. See also Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent
Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019) (explaining the alienation resulting from AI decision-making
and setting forth proposals for alleviating it).
31. For a preview of the type of unexpected data analysis that might occur, consider a recent study
which predicted persons’ likelihood of being in car accidents from Google Maps images of their homes.
KINGA KITA-WOJCIECHOWSKA, & ŁUKASZ KIDZI SKI, GOOGLE STREET VIEW IMAGE OF A HOUSE
PREDICTS CAR ACCIDENT RISK OF ITS RESIDENT (2019),
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1904/1904.05270.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQM9-LP8M].
32. See MARK ANDREJEVIC, AUTOMATED MEDIA 77 (1st ed. 2020) (examining how threats of
surveillance and future punishment subordinate individual rights); Julie E. Cohen, What is Privacy For?,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013) (discussing modulation); NEIL M. RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY
MATTERS (2021).
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have justifiably been considered improper for outside surveillance. Second, there
is a power differential between the state and the claimant. Government should
not take advantage of the vulnerability of claimants to upend long-established
social expectations of privacy. Otherwise, it may create what is effectively a
competition for exposure among claimants, each worried that if they fail to agree
to certain forms of surveillance via the black box AI (or convincingly performing
in areas where such surveillance is possible), they risk losing benefits.
All these objections may seem to melt before the universal solvent of consent.
However, the validity of consent is in question when much of the data and
analysis ostensibly consented to is opaque to the claimant. And even if that
objection can be overcome by providing some generalized description of the data
and analysis, other normative problems emerge at a societal level. The
competitive dimensions of “consented” disclosure ensure that social conditions
can easily render the proposed deal coercive over time. Once a critical mass of
persons has agreed to the big data analysis, to resist surveillance is to risk
stigmatizing oneself as a person with something to hide. Legislators need to
ensure that there is a common and inalienable right against being surveilled by
intrusive new technologies, particularly when some arms of the state may
weaponize their existing delays and dysfunction to force claimants into
competing for favorable treatment by sacrificing their privacy.33
Unfortunately, the law has been trending in the opposite direction in cognate
areas. It has required residents of public housing to give up basic rights as a
condition of benefits, as Rachel Hannaford has described in Trading Due Process
Rights for Shelter.34 When this unfair bargain was challenged in Department of
Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,35 the Supreme Court did not even
address the petitioners’ unconstitutional conditions claims directly.36 From a
purely contractarian perspective, this perspective makes sense: let the petitioners
find other shelter if they do not find the terms of public housing amenable.
However, this formalistic view elides the many challenges to dignity such onesided leases impose on some of the most vulnerable persons in our society. Their
marginalization deserves remedial attention, rather than being treated as one
more point of vulnerability to be exploited.

33. Privacy concerns are particularly relevant given the centrality of the applicant’s body in U.S.
disability determinations, which consider (inter alia) whether a claimant has a “severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” (or combination of impairments). 20 C.F.R. § 416.921
(2019). The centrality of the body in privacy law and theory is a normative dimension of data protection
of long standing. See ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011).
34. Rachel Hannaford, Trading Due Process Rights for Shelter: Rucker and Unconstitutional
Conditions in Public Housing Leases, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2003).
35. See Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
36. See id. at 136 n.6 (shutting down respondents’ attempts to raise constitutional challenges).
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IV
CONCLUSION
Despite the threats to privacy it portends, black box AI has already garnered
interest from some academics as a method for automating certain legal
determinations. Indeed, a recent conference on personalized law at the
University of Chicago showcased proposals to dynamically adapt legal
requirements for individuals and corporations based on automated or semiautomated analysis of vast quantities of data collected about them.37 Expectations
about the increasing volume, variety, and velocity of even more data about states
of the world (and persons) grounds more ambitious visions of a future of law
driven by big data.38 Advanced technology can also promote a combination of
approaches, such as smart contracts and personalization. At its limit, this vision
replaces rules and standards with “microdirectives,” specific requirements fusing
factual determinations and legal control of behavior.39 For example, a traffic
authority may alter the speed limit driver by driver, based on drivers’ history of
accidents and moving violations. Such personalization imports a utilitarian
reasoning common in antitrust’s measurement of consumer welfare, to law
generally.40 In other words, from this Benthamite perspective, law’s primary goal
is to optimize some objective function (such as speed and convenience traded off
against risk of injury and death).41 Such an objective function can be extrapolated
into the future based on analysis of the past (say, when deaths and injuries
reached an unacceptable level, based on the speed of driving of individuals like
those who are now being regulated).
The problems with such an approach are twofold. Black box AI could be
inaccurate or unfair, and resistant to the usual corrective procedures that have
helped mitigate other sources of unfairness and inaccuracy. Moreover, its
widespread imposition may be deeply alienating. We are only in the beginning
stages of articulating proper channels for collective governance of such scenarios.
Without such collective governance, we risk moving seamlessly from the
37. See Symposium on Personalized Law, 86 CHI. L. REV. 217 (2019) (including various articles on
this topic).
38. See VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 174–78 (2013) (discussing how big data can
influence how laws are applied and legal decision-making); IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY
THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 77–78 (2008) (highlighting the use of big data
to reveal that longer sentences for criminal defendants do not have an impact on recidivism rates).
39. Anthony Case & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1401
(2017) (“A microdirective, like a rule, provides a clear instruction to a citizen on how to comply with the
law. But, like a standard, a microdirective is tailored to and adapts to each and every context.”).
40. See WILLIAM DAVIES, THE LIMITS OF NEOLIBERALISM: AUTHORITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE LOGIC OF COMPETITION (2015).
41. See generally, Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789) https://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html [https://perma.cc/96MC-F7JD].
Bentham was a pioneer of Utilitarianism, proponents of his work support the development of law and
policy that achieves an ideal balance of benefit versus harm as interpreted through measurable criteria.
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“juridification of the lifeworld” critiqued by Habermas42, to a “technification of
the lifeworld”—no less alienating in its failure to put human accountability at the
heart of state action. The use of black box AI to deny benefits is deeply suspect,
especially given the numerous examples of bias now emerging in large language
models.43
From a utilitarian perspective, it may seem strange to limit the state in this
way, foregoing a chance for a judicial supercomputer to cross-correlate millions
of variables. Language seems so weak a tool in comparison. However, its limits
can be strengths.44 The burden of writing or speaking word by word ensures a line
of thought capable of being comprehended (and challenged) by hearers. This
idea is beautifully conveyed in Matthew Lopez’s The Inheritance, when an
imagined E.M. Forster says to an aspiring writer: “All your ideas are at the
starting post, ready to run. And yet they must all pass through a keyhole in order
to begin the race.”45 Word by word, a text or talk can be understood, agreed with,
or disputed. Until the ability to challenge machine learning methods is similarly
accessible and democratized, we should be wary of entrusting AI with the
evaluation of humans. And even then, hermeneutics are inescapable: much of
what counts as genuine data of positive and negative outcomes will be up for
debate, ensuring ineliminably human participation in the gathering of the data
necessary for black box computation. All these challenges counsel against using
black box AI in administrative adjudications of benefit determinations, especially
when simpler and more transparent software is still in early stages of deployment.

42. Habermas envisioned a dichotomy in 20th century society that split the conscious social acts and
institutions driven by human consent in everyday life—the “lifeworld”—from that of acts and institutions
that demand formalized conduct—the “system.” Through mounting “juridification of the lifeworld,” i.e.,
the increasing use of laws to govern everyday life, Habernas observed that decisions made for and by
people in modern society were becoming increasingly distant from the volition of the people themselves.
See Bohman, et al., Jürgen Habermas, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
Zalta ed., 2017) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/ [https://perma.cc/4EFR-DGCS].
43. EMILY M. BENDER, TIMNIT GEBRU, ANGELINA MCMILLAN-MAJOR, & MARGARET
MITCHELL, ON THE DANGERS OF STOCHASTIC PARROTS: CAN LANGUAGE MODELS BE TOO BIG?
(2021) https://faculty.washington.edu/ebender/papers/Stochastic_Parrots.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z59PS8A].
44. See Frank Pasquale, Foreword to IS LAW COMPUTABLE?, at xv (Deakin & Markou, eds., 2020)
(arguing that language allows for flexibility a computer code cannot recreate).
45. MATTHEW LOPEZ, THE INHERITANCE 5–8 (2018).

